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People with aphantasia have impoverished visual imagery so struggle to form mental pictures 
in the mind’s eye. By testing people with and without aphantasia, we investigate the 
relationship between sensory imagery and sensory sensitivity (i.e., hyper- or hypo-reactivity to 
incoming signals through the sense organs). In Experiment 1 we first show that people with 
aphantasia report impaired imagery across multiple domains (e.g., olfactory, gustatory etc.) 
rather than simply vision. Importantly, we also show that imagery is related to sensory 
sensitivity: aphantasics reported not only lower imagery, but also lower sensory sensitivity. In 
Experiment 2, we showed a similar relationship between imagery and sensitivity in the general 
population. Finally, in Experiment 3 we found behavioural corroboration in a Pattern Glare 
Task, in which aphantasics experienced less visual discomfort and fewer visual distortions 
typically associated with sensory sensitivity. Our results suggest for the very first time that 
sensory imagery and sensory sensitivity are related, and that aphantasics are characterised by 
both lower imagery, and lower sensitivity. Our results also suggest that aphantasia (absence of 
visual imagery) may be more accurately defined as a subtype of a broader imagery deficit we 
name dysikonesia, in which weak or absent imagery occurs across multiple senses. 
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Mental imagery is the mechanism by which we mentally simulate perceptual 
experiences - from visualising a friend’s face in the mind’s eye, to hearing our favourite song 
in the ‘mind’s ear’ (and similarly for our other senses). Mental images themselves are “iconic” 
in that visual images in some way resemble internal pictures, and auditory images in some way 
resemble internal sounds. Being able to form mental images is an essential part of life for many 
people but this capability varies from person to person. For some people, visual mental imagery 
is exceptionally strong and nearly as vivid as real-life perception, while for others it is virtually 
or completely absent, a condition known as aphantasia (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015, 
2016; Zeman et al., 2020). One question we ask in this paper is whether the imagery deficit 
that characterises aphantasia in the visual domain is apparent too in other sense domains. For 
example, we ask whether people with aphantasia also have impaired imagery for taste, smell, 
touch and so on. But as well as differing on how sensory information is imaged, people also 
vary on how sensory information makes them feel. Some people have a comfortable tolerance 
for incoming sensory stimuli from the outside world, while others have sensory sensitivities 
(i.e., an under- or over- responsiveness to sounds, smells, tastes etc., see below; e.g., Robertson 
& Simmons, 2013). Here, we also ask for the very first time whether sensory sensitivities and 
sensory imagery are related. Using self-report and behavioural methods we will show that 
aphantasic individuals experience not only lower imagery, but also lower sensory sensitivity. 
We present three experiments testing these ideas but begin with brief overviews of aphantasia, 
imagery and sensory sensitivity. 
People with aphantasia report either a complete lack of visual mental imagery, or 
imagery that is only dim, vague or fleeting (e.g., Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Zeman et al., 2015). 
Aphantasia has until now been defined exclusively as an absence of visual imagery (Milton et 
al., 2021; Zeman et al., 2015, 2016, 2020) but of course mental imagery itself can encompass 
other modalities too, including auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motor, and bodily 
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imagery. For us to investigate the nature of aphantasia (and subsequently, to investigate how 
imagery and sensation are themselves linked) an important initial question is whether the 
imagery impairment seen in aphantasia also extends to other sense domains. There are a 
number of reasons to think this might be the case. ‘Aphantasia-like’ deficits in non-visual 
imagery do indeed exist: there are vast individual differences in the vividness of auditory 
imagery (Berger & Ehrsson, 2017), olfactory imagery (Leclerc et al., 2019), gustatory imagery 
(Tiggemann & Kemps, 2005), tactile imagery (Belardinelli et al., 2009), motor imagery (Isaac 
& Marks, 1994), and bodily imagery (Andrade, May, Deeprose, Baugh, & Ganis, 2014), with 
some individuals reporting imagery almost as vivid as real-life perception, while others report 
a total absence of imagery. Although poor imagery in one domain does not necessarily preclude 
high imagery in another (Andrade et al., 2014), positive correlations in imagery strength do 
exist across different sensory modalities (Andrade et al., 2014; Leclerc et al., 2019; Lima et al., 
2015; White, Ashton, & Law, 1974). This suggests that people with aphantasia may indeed 
have weak/absent imagery in other non-visual domains.  
Other suggestions come from first-hand reports from writers with aphantasia (e.g., 
Watkins, 2018) and from one valuable recent survey of 1000 aphantasic people, of whom 54% 
suggested they might have weak/absent imagery in all sensory modalities (Zeman et al., 2020). 
However, this was elicited by a single question (‘Are all types of imagery affected, or can you 
imagine sounds (including music), textures (by imagined touch), tastes or smells?’; Zeman et 
al., 2020), which required participants to self-diagnose without other means to determine 
whether their imagery (e.g., gustatory imagery) was better or worse than the average person. 
A recent study, too, by Dawes, Keogh, Andrillon, and Pearson (2020) found that aphantasics 
reported significantly weaker mental imagery than controls in the auditory, tactile, kinaesthetic, 
taste, olfactory and bodily subscales of Sheehan’s adaption of Bett’s Questionnaire Upon 
Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967). Although their findings represent an important step in 
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understanding the phenomenology of aphantasia, their questionnaire has been criticised for 
having a small number of items per modality, and for including items that are unclear or out-
dated (e.g., imagining ‘the whistle of a locomotive’; see e.g., Pecher, van Dantzig, & 
Schifferstien, 2009; Spiller, Jonas, Simner, & Jansari, 2015). Here, we therefore address this 
same question, measuring aphantasics’ mental imagery across multiple sense domains, but 
using a series of contemporary standardised questionnaires. These measures may indeed show 
that the phenomenology of aphantasia extends across multiple senses. Such a finding would be 
important because it would indicate that the current literature-wide focus on aphantasia as a 
visual deficit may be hiding a wider phenomenology.  
A final reason to suspect that aphantasics may have low or absent imagery in non-visual 
domains comes from considering its possible neural basis. Visual imagery has been linked to 
levels of excitability in the visual cortex, meaning that aphantasics may potentially have 
excitability differences (Cattaneo, Pisoni, Papagno, & Silvanto, 2011; Sparing et al., 2002, but 
see Keogh, Bergmann, & Pearson, 2020). If this is true, then these differences in excitability 
might potentially be found in other sensory regions within the same brain. One way to 
understand the link between imagery and excitability is to look at studies of the visual cortex 
using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Using TMS can induce visual effects known 
as phosphenes. Importantly, engaging in visual imagery lowers phosphene thresholds 
(Cattaneo et al., 2011; Sparing et al., 2002), where low thresholds represent high excitability 
(i.e., less stimulation to generate a phosphene; e.g., Stewart, Walsh, & Rothwell, 2001). This 
suggests that since aphantasics have poor imagery, they may therefore have low excitability. 
Although phosphene thresholds have not been measured in aphantasia, supporting evidence is 
that high imagers have high visual excitability. For example, people with the sensory condition 
synaesthesia tend to score highly on mental imagery questionnaires; (e.g., Barnett & Newell, 
2008; Price, 2009; Spiller et al., 2015, but see Dance et al., 2021; Simner, 2013), while also 
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showing high visual cortex excitability compared to controls (Terhune, Murray, et al., 2015; 
Terhune, Song, & Cohen Kadosh, 2015; Terhune, Tai, Cowey, Popescu, & Cohen Kadosh, 
2011). Important to our purposes here, cortical excitability has also been implicated in other 
imagery domains too (e.g., engaging in motor imagery reduces motor thresholds; Fadiga et al., 
1999; Hashimoto & Rothwell, 1999; Stinear, Byblow, Steyvers, Levin, & Swinnen, 2006). We 
propose, therefore, that people with aphantasia may have lower excitability in the visual cortex, 
and that this reduced excitability may extend to other sensory regions. If so, people with 
aphantasia may typically have poor imagery in more than one sense.  
The role of cortical excitability in imagery also raises a second important question. 
Visual cortex excitability has also been linked to a second phenomenon, sensory sensitivity 
(e.g., Green et al., 2013; Wilkins et al., 1984). Sensory sensitivity is a disturbance in the way 
individuals react to incoming sensory stimuli from the outside world. For example, someone 
who is visually hyper-sensitive might find lights too glaring, and avoid bright environments 
(e.g., supermarkets). They might also experience greater discomfort and visual distortions (e.g., 
shimmering, and flashes) in the Pattern Glare Task, in which participants are shown gratings 
(parallel lines) at particular spatial frequencies that trigger visual sensitivities (Braithwaite, 
Broglia, Bagshaw, & Wilkins, 2013; Evans & Stevenson, 2008; Ward et al., 2017; Wilkins et 
al., 1984). Visual discomfort and distortions themselves are a form of ‘visual stress’ (‘pattern 
glare’), indicative of visual sensitivity (Braithwaite, Broglia, Bagshaw, et al., 2013; 
Braithwaite, Broglia, Brincat, et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2017; Wilkins et al., 1984). Important 
to our purposes here is that sensory sensitivities – like imagery – appear to relate to cortical 
excitability (e.g., Green et al., 2013; Wilkins et al., 1984). Hyper-excitability in the cortex (i.e., 
lower phosphene thresholds; e.g., Stewart et al., 2001) has been found in sensory-sensitive 
populations (e.g., people with migraine) and is associated with heightened pattern glare in these 
individuals (Aurora, Cao, Bowyer, & Welch, 1999; Aurora, Welch, & Al-Sayed, 2003; Aurora 
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& Wilkinson, 2007; Brigo et al., 2012; Chadaide et al., 2007; Coutts, Cooper, Elwell, & 
Wilkins, 2012; Huang, Cooper, Satana, Kaufman, & Cao, 2003; Huang et al., 2011; Mulleners, 
Chronicle, Palmer, Koehler, & Vredeveld, 2001; Wilkins et al., 1984; Young et al., 2004). 
Other research, too, shows that special populations who tend to be high in imagery 
(synaesthetes, noted above for having high visual cortex excitability; Terhune et al., 2015, 
2011) report high levels of sensory sensitivity (Van Leeuwen, Van Petersen, Burghoorn, 
Dingemanse, & Van Lier, 2019; Ward, Brown, Sherwood, & Simner, 2018; Ward et al., 2017), 
and increased susceptibility to pattern glare (Ward et al., 2017). Taken together, this research 
raises the possibility that excitation within the visual cortex may give rise to both imagery 
differences and sensitivity differences within the same individuals. Here, we draw an explicit 
link between these findings, hypothesising for the first time that imagery and sensitivity are 
linked. Specifically, we predict that individuals with low/absent imagery (aphantasics) might 
report lower sensory sensitivity than the average person. 
So far, our predictions have linked imagery and sensory sensitivity, but we have 
implicitly focussed on hyper-sensitivity (e.g., high/low excitability in high/low imagery linked 
to high/low hyper-sensitivity). But properly speaking, sensory sensitivity encompasses both 
hyper- and hypo- sensitivities (Robertson & Simmons, 2013). A person who is hyper-sensitive 
(in the visual domain for example) may find bright lights too glaring and seek to avoid them, 
while a person who is hypo-sensitive may experience low responsivity (‘sensory dampening’) 
and actively seek visual stimulation (e.g., flick their fingers in front of the eyes; Ben-Sasson et 
al., 2009; Bogdashina, 2003; Simmons et al., 2009). Paradoxically, hyper- and hypo-
sensitivities are often found within the same individual, either across sense modalities (e.g., 
avoiding bright lights, but seeking odours) or within modalities (e.g., disliking loud noises, but 
playing the same song over and over; Robertson & Simmons, 2013; Smees, Rinaldi, Simmons, 
& Simner, 2020; Ward et al., 2017). Above, we hypothesised a link between imagery and 
IMAGERY AND SENSORY SENSITIVITY IN APHANTASIA 
 8 
hyper-sensitivity, but are there links to both hyper- and hypo-sensitivity? In fact, we predict 
lower sensory sensitivities in aphantasics in both hyper- and hypo-domains, because these 
domains have themselves been linked through mechanisms of adaptation (Takarae & Sweeney, 
2017; Ward, 2019).  
Adaptation is when we stop noticing the smell of someone’s perfume, for example, 
after having been in their company for a while (Dalton, 2000; Takarae & Sweeney, 2017; Ward, 
2019). Normal adaptation is driven by a reduction in neural activity in response to continuous 
or repeated sensory input (Takarae & Sweeney, 2017; Thompson & Spencer, 1966). Failures 
in adaptation are linked to high levels of cortical excitation and therefore hyper-sensory 
sensitivity (Green et al., 2015). Specifically, high cortical excitation may prevent neural 
adaptation, meaning a stimulus remains ‘prominent’ in attention and becomes overbearing 
(Takarae & Sweeney, 2017; Ward, 2019). However, this same failure in adaptation may also 
give rise to hypo-sensitivity through the prioritising of old stimuli (i.e., the stimuli we are not 
adapting to). Prioritising old stimuli means that new stimuli are not easily recognised, leading 
to sensory dampening (i.e., hypo-sensitivity; Takarae & Sweeney, 2017). This fact may explain 
why individuals who report high levels of hyper-sensitivity often report high levels of hypo-
sensitivity (Robertson & Simmons, 2013; Ward et al., 2017), and taken together, all these facts 
also make predictions about people with aphantasia. If strong imagery is linked to heightened 
cortical excitability, and heightened cortical excitability is linked to hyper-sensitivity (but also 
hypo-sensitivity via problems with sensory adaptation), we would expect people with very low 
imagery (aphantasia) to have lower levels of hyper-/hypo-sensitivity, when compared to 
imaging controls.  
We summarise our hypothesised link between imagery, sensory sensitivity and cortical 
excitation in Figure 1. Our model suggests that aphantasia may be characterised by lower levels 
of visual cortex hyperexcitability, with this mediating both low imagery and low sensitivities 
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to incoming sensory information. Our model makes several predictions. First, people with 
aphantasia (impoverished visual imagery) may report fewer sensory sensitivities within the 
visual sense, relative to imaging controls (Experiment 1). Second, we predict that people with 
aphantasia may in fact have poor imagery across multiple domains (visual, gustatory, olfactory 
etc; Experiment 1). If so, we predict, thirdly, that people with aphantasia may also therefore 
self-report lower sensory sensitivities across multiple domains (Experiment 1). Thirdly, we 
predict that the sensory sensitivities reported in Experiment 1 by people with aphantasia should 
be corroborated by behavioural findings in a subsequent study (Experiment 3): aphantasics 
should experience fewer visual distortions and less visual discomfort than controls in response 
to irritable visual gratings in a Pattern Glare Task. Finally, if our model holds true in the 
population at large, then we predict visual imagery and sensory sensitivity to be positively 
correlated in a general population sample (Experiment 2). In summary, by investigating, for 
the first time, the relationship between imagery and sensory sensitivity, the present research 
aims to enhance our understanding of imagery, sensory sensitivity, cortical excitation, and 
aphantasia. 
 
Figure 1. Excitability, Imagery, and its Measurements. Our proposed model links imagery, cortical 
excitation, and sensory sensitivity. Our model posits that low cortical excitability may be tied to low 
imagery (e.g., in people with aphantasia) and lower levels of sensory sensitivity. Our model is 
ambivalent about directionality (i.e., causality) and may be multi-directional. Indeed, levels of imagery 
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(a ‘top-down’ process) and incoming sensory signals (a ‘bottom-up’ process) may influence levels of 
cortical excitability (or vice versa) on a moment-to-moment basis. We have presented our model in 
terms of low excitability to capture the experiences of aphantasics but note that the links proposed are 
correlational (i.e., it also predicts a link between high excitability/ imagery/ sensitivity). Here we have 
applied our model to visual imagery, but suggest it extends to the other sense domains also. 
 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment we compared the profile of mental imagery and sensory sensitivity 
in people with and without aphantasia. We asked whether the imagery deficit reported by 
people with aphantasia extends across multiple sense domains, and whether this maps on to 
fewer sensory sensitivities. In our study we were mindful to factor out unwanted influences. 
Sensory sensitivities are not only variable within the general population (Horder, Wilson, 
Mendez, & Murphy, 2014; Robertson & Simmons, 2013) but are particularly characteristic of 
individuals with autism spectrum conditions (henceforth autism) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) or non-clinical autistic traits (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Bogdashina, 2003; 
Horder et al., 2014; Robertson & Simmons, 2013, 2015; Simmons et al., 2009). Importantly, 
higher autistic traits are also found in people with aphantasia (Dance et al., 2021; Milton et al., 
2021). These facts could potentially link imagery, aphantasia, and sensory sensitivities via the 
medium of autism. Participants in Experiment 1 were therefore screened using the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001) and 
AQ scores were added into our analyses of sensory sensitivity as covariates. Note, however, 
that our predictions stand in the opposite direction to any confound. If people with aphantasia 
had any predisposition with regards to sensory sensitivities, their higher traits of autism would 
make this more likely. Instead, we are predicting fewer sensitivities for people with aphantasia, 
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We recruited 164 aphantasics (101 female, 62 male, 1 other; M age = 42.35, SD = 15.95) 
and 138 controls (67 female, 70 male, 1 other; M age = 37.39, SD = 13.83)1. The majority of 
our aphantasic participants (n=158) were recruited from the University of Sussex’s Imagery 
Lab - Aphantasia Cohort while the remaining aphantasic participants (n=6) were recruited from 
the student body of the University of Sussex. Control participants were recruited from multiple 
sources including Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; a platform for collecting quality data; 
Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013), and via word-of-mouth and social media. 
Participants were separated into their two groups using the ‘gold standard’ 
questionnaire for aphantasia (Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire; VVIQ; Marks, 1973, 
1995) whose scores range from 16-80 (see below) and where a score between 16-32 is 
indicative of aphantasia (i.e., imagery is either absent or vague/dim; Keogh & Pearson, 2018; 
Zeman et al., 2015). The protocol for the VVIQ is given below, but we point out here that 
people show good metacognition about their own imagery abilities, and self-report measures 
such as this correlate well with behavioural validations (e.g., Keogh & Pearson, 2018; Pearson, 
Rademaker, & Tong, 2011). Our aphantasics scored the required 16-32 on the VVIQ (M = 
17.49, SD = 3.44), while our non-aphantasic controls scored above 32 (M = 59.67, SD = 11.93). 
As compensation for taking part, non-students were entered into a prize draw for a shopping 
voucher, and MTurk participants were given a monetary payment of $4 (for our 25 minute 
test). For all experiments reported in this paper, participants provided informed consent prior 
to taking part, and ethical approval came from the University of Sussex Sciences and 
Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Board. 
Materials and Procedure 
 
1 This age difference of  5̴ years across groups was significant (t(299.72) = -2.89, p = .004). However, all our 
analyses (see Results) remain the same when repeated with age as a covariate (see Supplementary Information).  
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 Participants completed eight questionnaires online in a random order. (Our Imagery 
Lab - Aphantasia Cohort had already completed the VVIQ, so completed the remaining seven 
questionnaires.) Six questionnaires measured imagery (summarised in Table 1), while the final 
two questionnaires measured sensory sensitivities, and autistic traits. These eight measures are 
described below. Our study was hosted on our in-house testing platform (www.syntoolkit.org).  
Table 1 
Names and Domains of Imagery Questionnaires, with Abbreviations (Abbr.). Citations for 
these scales are given in the text below. 
Domain Questionnaire Abbr. 
Visual Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire VVIQ 
Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire  Psi-Q 
Auditory Clarity of Auditory Imagery Scale CAIS 
Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire  Psi-Q 
Olfactory Vividness of Olfactory Imagery Questionnaire VOIQ 
Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire  Psi-Q 
Tactile Adapted Shortened Betts’ Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery 




Movement Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire Kinaesthetic 
Scale 
VMIQ 
Feeling Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire  Psi-Q 
  
Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973). The VVIQ was 
our aphantasia diagnostic. In this questionnaire, participants were asked to imagine a series of 
four scenarios (e.g., “A beach by the ocean on a warm summer’s day”) and to rate the strength 
of their visual imagery for four aspects of each scene (e.g., “The appearance and colour of the 
water”). Imagery was rated on a five-point scale, comprising 1 (“No image at all, you only 
"know" that you are thinking of the object ”), 2 (“Vague and dim”), 3 (“Moderately clear and 
vivid”), 4 (“Clear and reasonably vivid”), and 5 (“Perfectly clear and as vivid as normal 
vision”). Responses were summed to give scores ranging from 16-80. As noted above, 
responses between 16-32 (no imagery or vague/dim) are indicative of aphantasia.  
Clarity of Auditory Imagery Scale (CAIS; Willander & Baraldi, 2010). Here, 
participants were asked to imagine a series of 16 sounds (e.g., “A dog barking”) and to rate 
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how clearly they could ‘hear’ the sounds on a scale of 1 (“No sound at all, you only "know" 
that you are thinking of the sound”) to 5 (“Perfectly realistic and as vivid as the actual sound”). 
All scale-points here (and in the other imagery questionnaires with the exception of the Psi-Q; 
see below) mirror the wording of the VVIQ (for this wording, see above). To achieve this, we 
slightly re-worded the original response-scale (which had been: 1-‘Not at all’, to 5-‘Very 
clear’) to ensure consistency with other imagery questionnaires in our study (e.g., VVIQ). Total 
scores range from 16-80.  
 Vividness of Olfactory Imagery Questionnaire (VOIQ; Gilbert, Voss, & Kroll, 
1997). Participants were asked to imagine four different odorous situations (e.g., “An outdoor 
cookout or barbeque”). Participants rated the vividness of their olfactory imagery for four 
aspects of each scenario (e.g., “The charcoal or wood has just been lit and is beginning to 
burn”) on a scale from 1 (“No odour at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the odour”) 
to 5 (“Perfectly realistic and as vivid as the actual odour”). Total scores range from 16-80.  
 Adapted Shortened Betts’ Questionnaire Upon Mental Imagery (Sheehan, 1967; 
Spiller et al., 2015). We used this questionnaire to measure imagery for taste, tactile, and 
bodily sensations. Participants were asked to imagine tasting 12 items (e.g., “Coffee”), 
touching 12 items (e.g., “Sand”), and the experience of 12 bodily sensations (e.g., “Hunger”). 
Given the methodological issues noted in our Introduction, we used the version of the Betts’ 
questionnaire updated by Spiller et al. (2015). This version differs from the original (used by 
Dawes et al. 2020) in a number of ways. First, our version replaces out-dated items (e.g., fur 
muff → fur), and makes items sensorily clearer where necessary (e.g., jelly → strawberry jelly). 
Also, in place of just 5 items in the original, it uses 12 items per sense - and the novel items 
(n7 per modality) are again contemporary (e.g., “Clingfilm (plastic wrap, Saran wrap)”). Since 
Spiller et al.’s updates had been made to only three scales (taste, tactile, and bodily sensations), 
we used just these three scales in our own work. Participants rated their imagery on a scale 
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from 1 (“No tactile sensation/taste/bodily sensation at all, you only "know" that you are 
thinking of the tactile sensation/taste/bodily sensation”) to 5 (“Perfectly realistic and as vivid 
as the actual tactile sensation/taste/bodily sensation”). Responses for each imagery scale (taste, 
tactile, bodily sensations) were summed separately, with possible scores ranging 12-60. 
 Vividness of Movement Imagery Questionnaire 2 (VMIQ-2; Roberts, Callow, 
Hardy, Markland, & Bringer, 2008). Using the kinaesthetic subscale of this questionnaire, 
participants were asked to imagine the feeling of performing 12 movements (e.g., “jumping 
sideways”). The direction of the scoring scale was reversed to match our other imagery 
questionnaires, meaning participants rated vividness from 1 (“No image at all, you only "know" 
that you are thinking of the skill”) to 5 (“Perfectly clear and vivid as normal feel of 
movement”). Responses were summed, with possible scores ranging from 12-60.  
Plymouth Sensory Imagery Questionnaire (Psi-Q; Andrade et al., 2014). This 
imagery questionnaire covers multiple domains, and was used in addition to our separate 
measures to ensure reliability of our results. Participants were asked to form a mental image of 
five items for each of the seven domains: visual (e.g., “a cat climbing up a tree”), auditory (e.g., 
“an ambulance siren”), olfactory (e.g., “a rose”), gustatory (e.g., “toothpaste”), tactile (e.g., “a 
soft towel”), bodily sensation (e.g., “having a sore throat”), feeling (e.g., “excited”). 
Participants rated each item on a scale from 0 (“No image at all”) to 10 (“Image as clear and 
vivid as real life”). This questionnaire provided imagery scores for each sense domain by 
averaging the items for each modality separately, with possible scores 0-10.  
Glasgow Sensory Questionnaire (GSQ; Robertson & Simmons, 2013). This 42 item 
questionnaire measures sensory sensitivity across seven sense domains (visual, auditory, 
olfactory, tactile, gustatory, vestibular, and proprioceptive) with six items per sense. Within 
each sense, half of the items (n=3) measure hyper-sensitivity and half measure hypo-sensitivity. 
Examples for hyper-sensitivity include “Do bright lights ever hurt your eyes/cause a 
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headache?” (visual) and items for hypo- sensitivity include “Do you really like listening to 
certain sounds (for example, the sound of paper rustling)?” (auditory). Each question is rated 
on a scale of 0 (“Never”), 1 (“Rarely”), 2 (“Sometimes”), 3 (“Often”), and 4 (“Always”). The 
measure outputs an overall sensitivity score summed across all items (ranging 0 to 168), as 
well as one score for each of the seven senses (e.g., auditory; ranging 0 to 24). It also produces 
two scores collapsed over senses for hypo- and hyper-sensitivity respectively (ranging from 0 
to 84 each). 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). This 50 item 
questionnaire asks about five types of autism symptomatology: imagination (e.g. “I find 
making up stories easy”; reversed scored), social skills (e.g. “I find it hard to make new 
friends”), communication (e.g. “I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation 
going”), attention switching (e.g. “I prefer to do things the same way over and over again”), 
and attention-to-detail (e.g. “I tend to notice details that others do not”). Participants rated their 
agreement on a 4-point scale: “Definitely agree”, “Slightly agree”, “Slightly disagree”, 
“Definitely disagree”. Responses are scored 1 for slightly/definitely agreeing with autism traits 
(poor imagination, communication, social skills, attention switching, but good attention-to-
detail), or 0 otherwise. Scores of ≥32 are taken as the usual suggestive threshold for autism 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). However, following Dance et al. (2021), we excluded one item 
that directly taps aphantasia phenomenology (‘I find it very easy to create a picture in my 
mind’), leaving AQ scores ranging from 0 to 49.  
Results 
Do Aphantasics have Poor Imagery in Multiple Domains? 
Using the Psi-Q (i.e., our measure of imagery across multiple sense domains), we first 
conducted a 2x7 ANOVA crossing group (aphantasia, controls) with sense (visual, auditory, 
tactile, olfactory, gustatory, bodily, feeling). Aphantasics reported significantly weaker 
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imagery than controls overall (F(1, 300) = 858.17, p <.001, ηp2 = .741; aphantasics: M = 1.29; 
SD = 1.94; controls: M = 7.62; SD = 1.78) and there was also a main effect of sense domain 
(F(3.91, 1173.01) = 22.72, p <.001, ηp2 = .070; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction; e.g., 
olfaction was a weaker imagery domain, see Figure 2). There was also a significant interaction 
(F(3.91, 1173.01) = 20.17, p <.001, ηp2 = .063; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction) because 
group differences were more pronounced for some senses over others (e.g., more pronounced 
for vision, less for feeling; see Figure 2). However, group differences were significant (i.e., 
aphantasics had weaker imagery) for every sense modality, using a series of bootstrapped 
independent samples t-tests with Welch correction (all p <.001, with large hedges’ g effect 
sizes = 1.77-4.48; see table S1 in our Supplementary Information, SI, for further details). Here, 
and throughout our manuscript, we report bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapped 
confidence intervals (with bootstrapping performed 1000 times) for group comparisons where 
deviations from normality are present in our data. After vision, tactile imagery was most 
affected, followed by olfactory, gustatory, bodily, auditory, and feeling imagery (see figure 2). 
All differences survive correction for the multiple pairwise comparisons performed using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995, 2000).  





Figure 2. Mean imagery scores (with 95% confidence intervals) as a function of group 
(aphantasia, control) and sense domain using the Psi-Q. Higher scores indicate stronger 
imagery (scores for each sense domain are on the same scale ranging from 0-10).                      
Note. *** uncorrected p <.001. 
 
Next, we sought to replicate our findings using our other sensory imagery 
questionnaires (auditory CAIS; olfactory VOIQ; gustatory Betts-ad; tactile Betts-ad; body 
sensation Betts-ad; movement VMIQ). Given that our imagery questionnaires were 
independent measures and had different total possible scores (see methods), we ran a series of 
bootstrapped independent samples t-tests with Welch correction comparing aphantasics to 
controls. Again, group differences were significant for every sense (i.e., aphantasics had 
weaker imagery; all p <.001, with large hedges’ g effect sizes 2.33-3.37; see table S1 in our SI 
for further details). These differences are depicted visually in Figure 3, and all differences again 
survive correction for multiple pairwise comparisons.  
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Figure 3. Mean imagery scores (with 95% confidence intervals) as a function of group 
(aphantasia, control) and sense domain using the independent sensory imagery questionnaires 
(visual; VVIQ, auditory; CAIS, olfactory; VOIQ, gustatory; Betts-ad, tactile; Betts-ad, body 
sensation; Betts-ad, movement; VMIQ). Higher scores indicate stronger imagery (maximum 
possible scores for each sense domain vary depending on the questionnaire; see methods). 
Note. *** uncorrected p <.001 (we did not conduct a group comparison of VVIQ scores 
because we used this measure to categorise people as aphantasic; see methods).  
 
Next, we asked whether the imagery deficits seen in our aphantasics were severe 
enough to be considered ‘aphantasia-like’ (i.e., imagery is entirely absent or vague/dim), even 
outside the visual domain. We therefore looked within each independent sensory imagery 
questionnaire (visual; VVIQ, auditory; CAIS, olfactory; VOIQ, gustatory; Betts-ad, tactile; 
Betts-ad, body sensation; Betts-ad, movement; VMIQ) and identified participants who scored 
within the standard aphantasia range (imagery is absent or vague/dim: scoring 16-32 on the 
VVIQ, CAIS, VOIQ; and 12-24 on Betts-ad, VMIQ), albeit for non-visual imagery. We found 
that 159 (97%) aphantasics showed aphantasia-like imagery weakness in at least one other 
(non-visual) domain, compared to 15 controls (11%), which was highly significant (2 (1, N = 
302) = 223.89, p <.001; using Yates correction). Moreover, 101 aphantasic individuals (62%) 
had aphantasia-like imagery (absent or vague/dim) across all other sense domains, compared 
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to 0 controls (2 (1, N = 302) = 124.94, p <.001), and 56 aphantasics (34%) reported no imagery 
at all (not vague/dim) in any domain at all (compared to 0 controls; 2 (1, N = 302) = 55.61, p 
<.001). In summary, aphantasics not only had weaknesses in visual imagery, but almost always 
(97%) had another imagery deficit (e.g., olfactory), and sometimes (62%) had deficits across 
all imagery modalities. 
 
Does Imagery Predict Sensory Sensitivity? 
Next, we asked whether aphantasics reported fewer sensory sensitivities than controls 
by looking at the GSQ. We conducted a 2x2x7 ANCOVA crossing group (aphantasic, control) 
with sensitivity type (hyper-, hypo-sensitivity) and sense domain (GSQ; visual, auditory, 
olfactory, tactile, proprioception, vestibular, gustatory). We included AQ scores as a covariate 
to control for the influence of autism traits. The ANCOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of group (F(1, 299) = 27.08, p <.001, ηp2 = .083, with aphantasics reporting fewer sensitivities 
overall (M = 50.52, SD = 22.88) relative to controls (M = 63.62, SD = 32.89).  
Although there was no significant main effect of sensitivity type (hyper/hypo), (F(1, 
299) = 1.81, p = .277, ηp2 = .004; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction), there was a significant 
interaction between sensitivity-type and group (F(1, 299) = 9.16, p = .003, ηp2 = .030; with 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction). Figure 4 suggests that although aphantasics are less sensitive 
than controls for both hyper-sensitivities and hypo-sensitivities, the effect is smaller for the 
former. We conducted two comparisons using bootstrapped independent samples t-tests with 
Welch correction to confirm that aphantasics reported significantly fewer hyper-sensitivities 
(M = 27.68; SD = 13.60), (t(263.81) = 2.84, p = .005, g = 0.33, BCa 95% CI [1.78, 8.37])), and 
hypo-sensitivities (M = 22.84, SD = 10.80), (t(224.09) = 4.81, p <.001, g = 0.58, BCa 95% CI 
[5.05, 11.17])), than controls (hyper: M = 32.72, SD = 16.68; hypo: M = 30.90, SD = 17.00; 
see Figure 4). Both differences survive correction for multiple pairwise comparisons using the 
Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995, 2000).  
IMAGERY AND SENSORY SENSITIVITY IN APHANTASIA 
 20 
 
Figure 4. Mean hypo- and hyper-sensitivity scores (with 95% confidence intervals) as a 
function of group (aphantasia, control) using the GSQ. Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
sensory sensitivity. Note. ** uncorrected p <.01, *** p <.001.  
 
Our ANCOVA also revealed a significant interaction between group and sense domain, 
(F(5.14, 1538.13) = 7.41, p <.001, ηp2 = .024; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction). To explore 
this interaction, we conducted a series of comparisons using bootstrapped independent samples 
t-tests with Welch correction, depicted visually in Figure 5 (see SI Table S2 for further 
information). Aphantasics reported significantly fewer sensitivities in the visual, olfactory, 
tactile, gustatory, vestibular, and proprioception domains, relative to controls (all p <.01, g = 
0.41-0.54). All differences here survive correction for multiple comparisons. There was, 
however, no difference between aphantasics and controls in auditory sensory sensitivity (p = 
.791,  g = 0.03). A Bayes Factor (using R version 3.5.1, R Core Team, 2018; Bayes Factor 
version 4.2, Morey & Rouder, 2018) of 0.13 suggested no group differences, with moderate 
confidence (assuming BF <.33 is taken as evidence for the null hypothesis; Dienes, 2014). 
Overall, this shows that with the exception of audition, aphantasics report lower levels of 
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sensory sensitivity across all sensory modalities in comparison to imaging controls, while also 
controlling for the influence of autism traits.  
Our ANCOVA also revealed other effects unrelated to our hypotheses (which we did 
not explore further, to reduce proliferation of multiple comparisons). For example, there was a 
significant main effect of AQ score, (F(1, 299) = 92.94, p <.001, ηp2 = .237) and sense domain, 
(F(5.14, 1538.13) = 12.60, p <.001, ηp2 = .040; Greenhouse-Geisser correction). As expected 
from the autism literature (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) higher AQ scores linked 
with higher sensory sensitivity, and as expected from the sensitivity literature (Robertson & 
Simmons, 2013), some sense domains were more sensitive than others (e.g., auditory domain 
most sensitive; see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean overall sensory sensitivity scores (with 95% confidence intervals) as a function 
of group (aphantasia, control) and sense domain using the GSQ. Higher scores indicate higher 
levels of sensory sensitivity (encompassing hypo- and hyper-sensitivity).                                                   
Note. ** uncorrected p <.01, *** p <.001.  
 
Discussion 
 Here, we found that aphantasics experience significantly weaker imagery than controls 
across multiple sense domains, and are significantly more likely to have aphantasia-like 
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imagery-weakness across multiple (and even all) senses compared to controls. Indeed, 97% of 
aphantasics (i.e., almost every one) had imagery deficits not only in the visual domain but also 
in at least one other. Aphantasics also reported fewer sensory sensitivities overall (in both 
hyper- and hypo-sensitivity), and fewer sensitivities within each of the senses with the 
exception of audition. In sum, our results show that imagery and sensory sensitivity are related: 
people with aphantasia experience lower levels of imagery and sensory sensitivity across 
multiple sense domains.  
Experiment 2 
 In Experiment 1 we demonstrated that imagery and sensory sensitivity are linked. But 
we are left with the question of whether the link between imagery and sensory sensitivity is 
seen specifically in aphantasic people, or whether it applies to the general population also. In 
Experiment 2 we addressed this question, by examining whether there is an association 




 Our participants were 83 undergraduate students registered at the University of 
Sussex (63 females, 20 males; M age = 19.87, SD = 3.60). Participants took part in our study 
in return for research participation credits, and were sampled without mention of imagery or 
aphantasia in order to represent a random sampling of the population. Six of these 
participants had VVIQ scores in the aphantasia range (16-32), but they are included here 
because their scores represent part of the natural continuum of imagery within a general 
population sample.  
Materials and Procedure 
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 Participants completed the VVIQ (Marks, 1973), GSQ (sensory sensitivity measure; 
Robertson & Simmons, 2013), and the AQ (to factor out autistic traits; Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001) in a random order. Details of these three measures are described in Experiment 1. 
Participants were provided with a URL to the testing site (www.syntoolkit.org) and they 
completed the study from their own homes.  
Results  
 To examine whether there was an association between imagery and sensory sensitivity 
we conducted a linear regression (using the enter method) predicting sensory sensitivity (GSQ) 
from visual imagery (VVIQ) and autism traits (AQ score). We constructed two regression 
models, the first predicting GSQ score from AQ score, and the second adding VVIQ score as 
an additional predictor. Our data was normally distributed, and the residuals in our models met 
the required assumptions for parametric tests (so confidence intervals were not bootstrapped). 
Both model one (F(1, 81) = 21.35, p <.001) and model two (F(2, 80) = 13.18, p <.001) 
significantly predicted sensory sensitivity scores. Model two was a significantly better model 
than model one, explaining 24.8% of the variance in sensory sensitivity scores (3.9% more 
than model one), (F(1, 80) = 4.17, p = .045). As expected from prior literature (Robertson & 
Simmons, 2013), model two revealed a significant positive relationship between autism traits 
(AQ) and sensory sensitivity (GSQ score; b = 1.24, SE(b) = .27, t = 4.61, p <.001, 95% CI 
[.706, 1.78]), showing that sensory sensitivity increased with levels of autism traits. 
Importantly, model two also showed a significant positive association between VVIQ score 
and GSQ score, (b = .26, SE(b) = .13, t = 2.04, p = .045, 95% CI [.007, .519]), indicating that 
as visual imagery scores increased, so did overall sensory sensitivity scores. Overall, our 
analysis shows that even when taking into account the influence of autistic traits (std. b = .45), 
visual imagery is a significant positive predictor (std. b = .20) of sensory sensitivity (see figure 
6 for the distribution of VVIQ scores). 
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 In Experiment 2 we investigated the relationship between visual imagery and sensory 
sensitivity in a general population sample taken from a student body. We found that imagery 
and sensory sensitivity are positively correlated, even when autistic traits are factored out. Our 
results therefore show that imagery is not only associated with levels of sensory sensitivity in 
people with aphantasia (Experiment 1), but that this relationship is also evident in the general 
population (Experiment 2). In other words, while in Experiment 1 we found that people with 
aphantasia (who are low in imagery) tend to experience reduced levels of sensory sensitivity, 
here we found further support in the general population: as visual imagery level increases, so 
does overall sensory sensitivity.  
Experiment 3 
 In Experiments 1 and 2 we demonstrated that people who report lower visual imagery 
also report lower sensory sensitivities – both in aphantasia, and in the general population. 
Experiment 3 aims to validate our findings using behavioural evidence from a Pattern Glare 
Task. In response to gratings designed to elicit pattern glare, we asked whether people with 
poor imagery would experience less visual sensory sensitivity (less visual discomfort, and 
fewer visual distortions) than we might otherwise expect. Here, we compared a sample of 
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people with aphantasia (low imagery) to controls with typical visual imagery abilities. We 




  Our participants were 56 aphantasics (28 female, 26 male, 2 other; M age = 33.66; SD 
= 8.36) and 56 controls (39 female, 17 male; M age = 29.84, SD = 16.91). Participants were 
matched in age (t(80.39) = -1.52, p = .133). Controls were recruited from the same sources as 
Experiment 1, with the addition of the undergraduate student body at the University of Sussex, 
and excluding Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Most of our aphantasic participants were recruited 
from the University of Sussex’s Imagery Lab - Aphantasia Cohort (n=54), with the remaining 
participants (n=2) recruited via the same sources as controls. Participants were verified as 
aphantasics in the same way as in Experiment 1 (scoring 16-32 on the VVIQ; M = 17.77, SD 
= 3.86; compared to controls who scored >32 on the VVIQ; M = 58.89, SD = 10.62). Of our 
participants, 24 also took part in Experiment 1 (19 aphantasics, 5 controls), and 5 also took part 
in Experiment 2 (5 controls).  Participants were advised not to take part in the study if they had 
a history of epilepsy given that uncomfortable visual patterns can trigger photosensitive 
epilepsy (Wilkins, Binnie, & Darby, 1980). Participants were compensated in the same way as 
Experiment 1.  
Materials and Procedure 
 All participants completed the pattern glare task online using the testing platform 
Inquisit (Inquisit 5 [Computer software], 2016). After the pattern glare task, participants 
completed the VVIQ, with the exception of participants who had already completed it 
previously. Please see Experiment 1 for a description of these latter participants (from our 
Imagery Lab - Aphantasia Cohort), as well as the VVIQ protocol. 
IMAGERY AND SENSORY SENSITIVITY IN APHANTASIA 
 26 
Pattern Glare Task. Participants viewed achromatic gratings, which were oval in 
shape and consisted of black and white horizontal stripes, presented on a grey background 
(RGB 128, 128, 128). Our version was based on Ward et al. (2017), who used gratings from 
Braithwaite, Broglia, Brincat, et al. (2013). There were three types of grating, each differing in 
spatial frequency: low (approx. 0.4 cycles per degree; cycles per degree is a measure of spatial 
frequency, see Braithwaite, Broglia, Bagshaw, et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2017; Wilkins et al., 
1984), medium (approx. 3 cycles per degree), and high (approx. 10 cycles per degree). The low 
spatial frequency grating acted as a baseline stimulus, whilst the medium and high spatial 
frequency gratings were ‘irritable’ gratings expected to elicit ‘pattern glare’ (Braithwaite, 
Broglia, Bagshaw, et al., 2013; Braithwaite, Broglia, Brincat, et al., 2013; Conlon, Lovegrove, 
Barker, & Chekaluk, 2001; Evans & Stevenson, 2008; Wilkins et al., 1984). Gratings were 
presented at their actual size of 230.01mm wide x 176.39mm high in the centre of the screen, 
and participants were instructed to sit 80cm/32 inches from the monitor. A calibration 
procedure ensured that gratings were presented at the standardised size (approx. 12.58 degrees 
in height) on each computer monitor (participants adjusted the length of a line to match the 
length of a bank card, to calculate the number of pixels required for the gratings to reach the 
standardised size).  
 Participants were told they should fixate their gaze on the centre of each pattern 
presented. Each grating was presented twice (each for 5 seconds) in a random order (6 trials 
overall). Following each grating (i.e., each trial), participants were asked two questions: how 
uncomfortable the image was, and how many visual effects were experienced. Comfort was 
measured on a sliding scale from 1 (“Extremely uncomfortable”) to 11 (“Extremely 
comfortable”), and visual effects were reported by checking any that applied (colours, bending 
of the lines, blurring of the lines, shimmering of the lines, flickering, fading, shadowy shapes, 
other effects; total effects for each grating ranging from 0-8). See figure 7 for an example of 
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the trial sequence. For each grating type (low, medium, high) the visual discomfort ratings and 
the number of visual effects elicited were averaged separately. Participants began the task with 
a practise grating of black and white checkers.  
 
Figure 7. The trial sequence in the Pattern Glare Task (using an example of a low spatial 
frequency grating). In each trial the grating was presented for 5 seconds, followed by 
questions about visual discomfort and visual effects experienced.  
 
Results 
For each of our measures (see below), we conducted a 2x3 ANOVA crossing group 
(aphantasic, control) and grating spatial frequency (high, medium, and low). These were 
followed by bootstrapped independent samples t-tests with Welch correction to examine 
differences in response to the gratings designed to elicit visual sensory sensitivity (medium- 
and high-spatial frequency). We did not conduct pairwise comparisons for the low (baseline) 
grating to avoid proliferation of multiple comparisons, and because our hypotheses did not 
motivate this (i.e., it has been well established that low spatial frequency gratings do not trigger 
IMAGERY AND SENSORY SENSITIVITY IN APHANTASIA 
 28 
visual sensory sensitivity; e.g., Braithwaite, Broglia, Bagshaw, et al., 2013; Evans & 
Stevenson, 2008; Ward et al., 2017; Wilkins et al., 1984). 
 The ANOVA for visual discomfort ratings revealed the expected main effect of spatial 
frequency (F(1.78, 195.81) = 46.25, p <.001, ηp2 = .269; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction), 
with more visual discomfort from the high (M = 5.31, SD = 1.67) and medium gratings overall 
(M = 5.81, SD = 1.71), relative to the low (baseline) grating (M = 6.70, SD = 1.75). There was 
no significant main effect of group (F(1, 110) = 2.21, p = .140, ηp2 = .020), but there was a 
significant interaction (F(1.78, 195.81) = 4.25, p = .019, ηp2 = .037; with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction). Although there was no significant difference in discomfort for the medium grating 
between aphantasics (M = 6.04, SD = 1.84) and controls (M = 5.58, SD = 1.54; t(106.73) = -
1.42, p = .159, d = 0.27, BCa 95% CI [-1.09, .156]; Bayes factor = 0.49, i.e., anecdotal support 
for null hypothesis), there was a significant difference for the high spatial frequency grating. 
Here, aphantasics reported significantly less visual discomfort (M = 5.71, SD = 1.70) than 
controls (M = 4.91, SD = 1.55), (t(109.03) = -2.62, p = .010, d = 0.49, BCa 95% CI [-1.39, -
.249]). This demonstrates that although both groups found the high grating uncomfortable 
(scores <6 indicate visual ‘discomfort’, and scores >6 indicate visual ‘comfort’), aphantasic 
individuals reported less discomfort than controls (see Figure 8, where scores are recoded 
around zero for ease-of-display). This result survives when correcting for the multiple 
comparisons performed using the Benjamini-Hochberg False Discovery Rate method 
(Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995, 2000).  




Figure 8. Mean visual discomfort ratings (with 95% confidence intervals) as a function of 
group (aphantasia, control) and grating spatial frequency (low, medium, high). For ease of 
visual display, scores were re-coded from a scale of 1-11 to a scale of -5 to 5 where scores 
above 0 indicate visual ‘comfort’, and scores below 0 indicate visual ‘discomfort’.                                   
Note. * uncorrected p <.05. 
 
We next looked at the number of visual effects for each participant. As before, and as 
expected, there was a main effect of spatial frequency, (F(1.82, 199.77) = 130.70, p <.001, ηp2 
= .543; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction) with more visual effects from high (M = 2.86, SD 
= 1.68) and medium gratings overall (M = 2.19, SD = 1.43), relative to the low (baseline) 
grating (M = .79, SD = 1.00). Our analysis also revealed a significant interaction (F(1.82, 
199.77) = 6.95, p = .002, ηp2 = .059; with Greenhouse-Geisser correction) because group 
differences were more pronounced for some gratings than others (e.g., for the high grating; see 
below and Figure 9), but no significant effect of group, (F(1, 110) = 3.18, p = .077, ηp2 = .028). 
As before, for the high spatial frequency grating, aphantasics reported significantly 
fewer visual effects (M = 2.50, SD = 1.44) than controls (M = 3.21, SD = 1.83), (t(104.41) = 
2.30, p = .024, d = 0.43, BCa 95% CI [.161, 1.22]). However, aphantasics also reported 
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significantly fewer visual effects (M = 1.89, SD = 1.26) than controls (M = 2.49, SD = 1.53) in 
response to the medium grating (t(106.03) = 2.26, p = .026, d = 0.43, BCa 95% CI [.110, 1.06]); 
see Figure 9), and all differences survive correction for multiple comparisons. 
 
Figure 9. Mean number of visual effects (with 95% confidence intervals) as a function of group 
(aphantasia, control) and grating spatial frequency (low, medium, high).                                       
Note. * uncorrected p <.05. 
 
Discussion 
 Here, we again present evidence that people with aphantasia experience less visual 
sensory sensitivity than people with visual imagery. As predicted, aphantasics reported 
significantly less pattern glare than controls: high/medium gratings gave them fewer visual 
effects, and the high gratings gave them less visual discomfort. These results provide 
behavioural corroboration for Experiment 1, showing that people with aphantasia experience 
lower levels of sensory sensitivity than imaging controls.  
 
General Discussion 
Our intention was to characterise the sensory imagery deficits and sensory sensitivities 
experienced by people with aphantasia, and in doing so, examine how imagery and sensory 
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sensitivity may be linked. Until now, aphantasia has been characterised by an absence of visual 
imagery (e.g., Milton et al., 2021; Zeman et al., 2015, 2016, 2020). But in Experiment 1 we 
found that aphantasic individuals report significantly weaker imagery compared to controls 
within all of the sense domains we tested (visual, olfactory, tactile, gustatory, bodily sensation, 
feeling, movement). When considering imagery in other senses in terms of the same criteria as 
aphantasia (i.e., imagery that is absent/dim/vague), we found that almost 100% of people with 
aphantasia had poor, aphantasia-like imagery in at least one other sense (i.e., 97% of 
aphantasics, but just 11% of controls), and as many as 62% of aphantasics had imagery-
weaknesses in all of their senses, compared to 0% of controls. In the most extreme cases, one 
third of aphantasics (34%) reported no imagery whatsoever in any sense whatsoever.  
Our results are in line with research showing that imagery strength is often positively 
correlated across sensory modalities (Andrade et al., 2014; Leclerc et al., 2019; Lima et al., 
2015; White et al., 1974), and fits with recent studies using different methods. For example, 
Dawes et al. (2020) found that 26% of aphantasics reported a complete lack of imagery across 
all sense domains they tested in their own study (compared to our 34%). Their paper was an 
important step in understanding the broader imagery phenomenology of aphantasia, although 
their imagery questionnaire (Sheehan’s adapted version of Betts’ Questionnaire Upon Mental 
Imagery; Sheehan, 1967) has been criticised for its small number of items and outdated 
language (e.g., Pecher et al., 2009; Spiller et al., 2015). Nonetheless, our results converged 
with their own, allowing our paper to stand as a validation and replication of their findings 
using multiple contemporary imagery questionnaires (see Experiment 1). Our results also fit 
with personal reports from aphantasic writers (Watkins, 2018) and with data from 1000 
aphantasics asked to self-diagnose imagery deficits, in which 54% reported imagery 
weaknesses across all sense modalities (Zeman et al., 2020) – compared to our own 62%. In 
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sum, our results provide robust evidence that people with aphantasia tend to self-report imagery 
that is weak across multiple senses.  
An important question that emerges from our findings is why aphantasics often 
experience multi-modal imagery deficits. We have suggested that understanding the neural 
mechanisms underlying mental imagery may shed light on this. Engaging in imagery is 
associated with activation in the relevant sensory cortex (e.g., visual imagery tied with visual 
cortex) and this has been shown for visual (Cattaneo et al., 2011; Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague, 
& David, 2007; Daselaar, Porat, Huijbers, & Pennartz, 2010; Dijkstra, Bosch, & van Gerven, 
2017; Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Sparing et al., 2002), auditory (Daselaar et al., 
2010; Zvyagintsev et al., 2013), olfactory (Djordjevic, Zatorre, Petrides, Boyle, & Jones-
Gotman, 2005; Leclerc et al., 2019; Plailly, Delon-Martin, & Royet, 2012), gustatory 
(Belardinelli et al., 2009; Kobayashi, Sasabe, Shigihara, Tanaka, & Watanabe, 2011; 
Kobayashi et al., 2004), tactile (Schmidt, Ostwald, & Blankenburg, 2014; Yoo, Freeman, 
McCarthy, & Jolesz, 2003), and motor imagery (Grèzes & Decety, 2000; Hanakawa, Dimyan, 
& Hallett, 2008; Hétu et al., 2013). Here, some studies showed a positive correlation between 
sensory cortex activation and imagery vividness (Belardinelli et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2007; 
Herholz, Halpern, & Zatorre, 2012), while others showed that the content of visual imagery 
can be decoded from visual cortex activity using multivariate decoding in fMRI (Albers, Kok, 
Toni, Dijkerman, & De Lange, 2013; Koenig-Robert & Pearson, 2019; Naselaris, Olman, 
Stansbury, Ugurbil, & Gallant, 2015). Similarly, low imagers rely less on visual cortex 
compared to high imagers when asked to complete visual imagery tasks (mental rotation; 
Logie, Pernet, Buonocore, & Della Sala, 2011), and studies using TMS show that engaging in 
visual imagery is associated with increased excitation in visual cortex (Cattaneo et al., 2011; 
Sparing et al., 2002). These findings, and others, linking imagery to activity in sensory cortices, 
lead us to propose that aphantasia may be characterised by low visual cortex excitation, and 
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that this may in fact be part of a wider deficit across multiple cortices within the same brain. 
This may give rise to the multi-modal imagery impairments seen in people with aphantasia, 
consistent with our model in Figure 1.  
It is important to recognise that there were rare instances where aphantasics reported 
intact imagery in non-visual senses (i.e., 3% of our aphantasics did not have absent/vague/dim 
imagery in another sense). Therefore, although having low imagery in one domain (visual) is 
often associated with imagery impairments in other senses, this may not always be the case. If 
our model holds true, having low cortical excitability in one sensory area may increase the 
likelihood of low excitability in other sensory areas, but we are proposing likelihoods not 
absolutes, and therefore expect individual differences. Testing these models with 
neuroscientific methods will be a fruitful avenue for future research. Alternatively, however, it 
is possible that even these 3% did have other imagery weaknesses, but simply in a sense 
domains we did not test (e.g., interoception, thermoception, nocioception, etc.). Therefore, 
testing these domains will be an important avenue for future research. 
A second feature of our model was the prediction that imagery may also link to sensory 
sensitivity (under- and over-responsiveness to sensory stimuli entering via the sense organs). 
In support of our model, we found that aphantasic individuals reported fewer sensory 
sensitivities, both overall (i.e., for both hypo- and hyper-sensitivity) and within every sense 
domain tested with the exception of audition. This effect remained even when factoring out 
autistic traits. In Experiment 2 we extended this finding to the general population, showing 
again a positive correlation between imagery and sensitivity while again factoring out AQ 
scores. In Experiment 3, we provided behavioural support: aphantasic individuals 
demonstrated less sensitivity than controls in a Pattern Glare Task (i.e., fewer visual effects 
from high/medium gratings and less visual discomfort from high gratings). Overall, our 
findings suggest that imagery and sensory sensitivity are linked, potentially (our model 
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suggests) via cortical excitability. We noted that cortical excitability has been traditionally 
associated with levels of hyper-sensitivity (i.e., increased cortical excitability linked to hyper-
responsiveness; Green et al., 2015, 2013; Wilkins et al., 1984). However, hyper- and hypo-
sensitivities are thought to be linked via adaptation (Takarae & Sweeney, 2017; Ward, 2019). 
This led us to predict that aphantasics – who we propose are low in cortical excitability – would 
show not only less hyper-sensitivity but also less hypo-sensitivity. This is indeed what we 
found. It is unclear why low sensitivity for aphantasics did not extend to auditory items 
(especially since sensory sensitivity is correlated across modalities). However, the auditory 
channel is also remarkable in being the most sensitive (Robertson & Simmons, 2013; and see 
Figure 5 for this clear difference). Further research is needed to better determine whether our 
null effect is genuine, by using alternative measures of auditory sensory sensitivity including 
those that employ sound stimuli and not simply questionnaire self-report. 
What specific neural mechanisms might underpin low excitation across multiple 
sensory cortices in aphantasia? Our model fits broadly with neural noise theories from the 
autism literature which suggest that high levels of sensory sensitivity in people with autism are 
driven – at least in part – by increased levels of neural noise (excitation) within sensory cortices 
(Milne, 2011; Rubenstein & Merzenich, 2003; Simmons, 2019; Simmons et al., 2009). This 
theory links neural noise with an increase in excitatory (e.g., glutamate) synaptic activity and 
a reduction of inhibitory (e.g., GABA) synaptic activity (e.g., Rubenstein & Merzenich, 2003; 
Wood et al., 2021). Although speculative at this point, the mechanisms behind low cortical 
excitability in aphantasia may therefore include lower levels of excitatory glutamatergic 
synaptic activity, and/or higher inhibitory GABA-ergic synaptic activity in sensory cortices 
and areas involved in sensory modulation/regulation (e.g., thalamus; Wood et al., 2021). 
Depending on the sensory cortices affected by these patterns of excitation, this may give rise 
to lower imagery, and sensitivity, in many, several, or a single sense domain. As a parallel, we 
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note that differences across disparate brain regions have also been found in a number of other 
sensory conditions, for example in synaesthesia where hyper-connectivity of white matter can 
arise in multiple brain regions, giving rise to different manifestations of what is considered the 
same underlying condition (Rouw & Scholte, 2007; Rouw, Scholte, & Colizoli, 2011).  
An important question raised by our findings is how aphantasia and autism are related. 
People with aphantasia report high levels of autism traits (Dance et al., 2021), and autism is 
usually linked with heightened sensory sensitivity (Ben-Sasson et al., 2009; Bogdashina, 2003; 
Horder et al., 2014; Robertson & Simmons, 2013, 2015; Simmons et al., 2009). But here we 
found the opposite: aphantasics showing lower levels of sensitivity. Moreover, we still found 
that AQ scores were positively related to sensitivity in our participants overall (when included 
as a covariate in our analysis of sensory sensitivity in Experiment 1). A simple explanation 
may lie in the fact that autism is a cluster of traits in different domains, and some populations 
(e.g., aphantasics) may show higher scores in only certain domains. We know already that 
aphantasics show weak imagination and social skills, but match controls on other autism traits 
such as attention-to-detail, attention switching, and communication (Dance et al., 2021). In 
other words, aphantasics may be like people with autism in some ways (imagination, social 
skills) but not in others (attention-to-detail – and indeed sensory sensitivity). Similar patterns 
have been found for other conditions, such as people with synaesthesia, who have higher AQ 
scores because they share the autistic trait of (only) attention-to-detail (Van Leeuwen et al., 
2019; Ward et al., 2018, 2017). It is possible that individuals with autism (or high in autistic 
traits) may experience somewhat less intense sensory sensitivity if they also have aphantasia. 
Teasing apart the specific instances where imagery maps directly onto sensory sensitivity will 
be an interesting avenue for future research. For now, we have begun to unravel the relationship 
between imagery and sensitivity by showing that aphantasic individuals experience lower 
sensory sensitivity than people who have visual imagery.  
IMAGERY AND SENSORY SENSITIVITY IN APHANTASIA 
 36 
Finally, our study also provides answers about the very nature of aphantasia. 
Aphantasia was originally named for its links to the Greek word for imagination (φαντασία) 
and the related term φάντασμα (phántasma, “phantasm, an appearance, image, apparition, 
spectre” (Online Etymology Dictionary, 2001; Thomas, 2011; Zeman et al., 2015). It also has 
etymological links to the word φαντάζω (phantázō, “I make visible”; Online Etymology 
Dictionary, 2001) which make it a highly useful term to describe an absence of imagery that is 
visual per se. However, our finding here that aphantasia is part of a broader deficit in imagery 
(see also Dawes et al. 2020; Zeman et al., 2020) leads us to suggest a second complementary 
term, dysikonesia. Like aphantasia, we propose that dysikonesia encompasses imagery that is 
absent or dim/vague, but we introduce this term to describe the broader phenotype, i.e., 
imagery deficits across multiple domains (as found in 97% of aphantasics tested here), or 
indeed for cases where the particular domain of the imagery deficit has not been specified. Its 
etymological root (icon2) has the useful meaning of a form which reflects its referent, in the 
same way that visual imagery has qualities that reflect visual entities in the world, and auditory 
imagery has qualities that reflect auditory entities in the world, and so on. People with 
dysikonesia, we suggest, therefore have visual and auditory (and other sensory) knowledge, 
but without the iconic quality of imagery. This classification makes aphantasia one sub-class 
of dysikonesia, and 3% of our aphantasic group experienced this subclass only (i.e., imagery 
deficit in only vision). Overall, our results provide an important step forward in understanding 
the experience of imagery in aphantasic individuals, and we open up a wider debate about 
phenomenology, and indeed the causes and consequences of absent imagery.  
  In conclusion, our study is the first to characterise the relationship between mental 
imagery and sensory sensitivity, the first to model this relationship, and the first to name and 
 
2 In dysikonesia, we have chosen an earlier form of orthography (ikon) simply to disambiguate pronunciation 
(i.e., avoiding the ambiguity of /c/ = [k] or [s]). 
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model a phenotype of poor imagery cross-senses. Our findings raise questions about the best 
way to define aphantasia, which we now embed within a broader multi-modal imagery deficit 
we term dysikonesia. We present both self-report and behavioural methods, and propose a 
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